טו אי אמרת בשלמא מעני לעני מחלוקת
15 [do we] then also [say] that she is not divorced?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The Mishnah in Git, 77a makes it clear that in such circumstances the wife is divorced. ');"><sup>13</sup></span> — He answered him: The basket is really at rest, and she walks underneath.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The basket is therefore like a 'fixed courtyard'. ');"><sup>14</sup></span> <b><i>MISHNAH</i></b>. IF A MAN, RIDING ON AN ANIMAL, SEES A LOST ARTICLE AND SAYS TO HIS NEIGHBOUR: 'GIVE IT TO ME'; THE LATTER] TAKES IT UP AND SAYS: 'I ACQUIRED IT [FOR MYSELF].' — [THEN] IT IS HIS. [BUT] IF AFTER GIVING IT TO HIM, THAT PERSON SAYS: 'I ACQUIRED IT FIRST', THERE IS NOTHING IN WHAT HE SAYS.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For as soon as he handed over the found object to that person it became the latter's property, no matter whether the former first acquired it for himself or not, and his subsequent declaration is of no avail. ');"><sup>15</sup></span> <b><i>GEMARA</i></b>. We have learned elsewhere:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Pe'ah. IV, 9; Cf. Git. 113. ');"><sup>16</sup></span> If one gleaned the corner of a field<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. Lev. XIX, 9. ');"><sup>17</sup></span> and said, 'This is for that poor person.' R. Eliezer says: he conferred possession [of the gleaning] on that person.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The gleaner of the corner of the field, who according to R. Eliezer may confer possession of the gleanings upon a poor individual, would have to be a stranger, not the owner of the field. For the owner, even if he is poor himself, has no right to the gleanings of the corners of his field (cf. Hul., 131a), and he could not therefore acquire it for others. As the argument 'Since (Miggo) he can take possession of it for himself he may also confer possession of it upon someone else' could not in this case be used, R. Eliezer would also say that the other poor person is not entitled to the gleanings to the exclusion of anyone else. ');"><sup>18</sup></span> But the Sages say: He must give it to the first poor person that comes along. 'Ulla said in the name of R. Joshua b. Levi: The difference of opinion [between R. Eliezer and the Sages] concerns [a case where] a rich person [gleaned] for a poor person. R. Eliezer is of the opinion [that] [i] since, if he had wished, he could have declared his possessions public property, so that he would have become a poor man [himself] and would have been entitled [to the gleanings of the corner], he is entitled [to them] even now, and [ii] since he might thus take possession [of them] for himself,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., if he had, in the stated circumstances, desired to acquire the gleanings, he could have legally made them his own. ');"><sup>19</sup></span> he could also confer possession [of them] upon his neighbour. But [the Sages] are of the opinion [that] we can use the Since argument once but not twice.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Only one miggo can be applied to a case, but not two miggos. In this case we would first have to say: miggo (since) a poor man can acquire the gleanings for himself he can also acquire them for a poor neighbour; and then we would have to say: miggo (since) if he wished to renounce his property he could acquire the status of a poor man, he may be given such status even if he is rich. ');"><sup>20</sup></span> But [in a case where] a poor person [gleaned] for [another] poor person all are of the opinion that he could confer possession [of the gleanings] upon that person, for since he could take possession [of them] for himself he could also confer possession [of them] upon his neighbour.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The one miggo would be accepted by all. ');"><sup>21</sup></span> R. Nahman said to 'Ulla: And why not say, Master, that the difference of opinion [between R. Eliezer and the Rabbis] concerns [even a case where] a poor person [gleaned] for a poor person. — seeing that in regard to a found object all are [in the same legal position as the] poor are in regard [to the corner of the field]?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Just as every poor person has a right to glean the corners of a field, so every person who finds an object has a right to pick it up and acquire it. ');"><sup>22</sup></span> And we learned: IF ONE, RIDING ON AN ANIMAL, SEES A LOST ARTICLE AND SAYS TO HIS NEIGHBOUR: 'GIVE IT TO ME'; THE LATTER TAKES IT UP AND SAYS: 'I ACQUIRED IT [FOR MYSELF].' — [THEN] IT IS HIS. Now, it is all correct if you say that the difference of opinion [between R. Eliezer and the Rabbis] concerns [even a case where] a poor person [gleaned] for a poor person.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And the Rabbis who differ from R. Eliezer would hold the view that although we may say, in the case of two persons picking up together a found object that each one acquires it for the other at the same time as he acquires it for himself (v. supra p. 37), yet in this case they would say that one poor man cannot acquire the gleanings for the other poor man. For in the case of the found object the argument is: 'Since (Miggo) he takes possession of it for himself, he may also take possession of it for his neighbour.' But in the case of the gleanings the argument would have to be: 'Since (Miggo), if he had wished, he could have taken possession of it for himself, he may also take possession of it for his neighbour' — and such an argument the Rabbis would not adopt. It would only be a potential miggo, which the Rabbis would not regard as valid. ');"><sup>23</sup></span> [for]